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Loved Ones Near and Far: Feinberg’s Personal Significance Theory
Commentary by William Hirstein (Elmhurst, IL)
Todd Feinberg’s personal significance theory offers a coherent and unified explanation for the misidentification syndromes, such as 
Capgras syndrome, as well as certain body-image disorders, such as asomatognosia and somatoparaphrenia. This reply offers sev-
eral criticisms directed toward sharpening the theory. First, personal significance is still a broad and indistinct concept, and most of 
the representations in our brains are of people and things of personal significance to us. Second, the idea that the Capgras patient 
has lost his sense of personal significance for, for example, his parents, does not explain why he believes they are impostors. A more 
specific hypothesis directed toward explaining this is that Capgras syndrome involves a type of mindreading disorder, in which the 
patient’s representation of his parents’ minds and personalities is damaged or inaccessible to his cognition. If we assume that our 
representations of peoples’ external features can become disconnected from our representations of their internal, mental features, 
this is exactly the sort of thing that would produce the appearance of an impostor. Third, the two-factor account of delusions offers 
a plausible competitor to Feinberg’s approach. According to it, Capgras syndrome is caused by two sites of damage in the brain, one 
that affects the way the person appears to the patient, and a second, frontal site of damage that affects the patient’s rationality in 
such a way that he does not notice the gross implausibility of the impostor claim.
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Synthesizing data from his extensive clinical experi-
ence, cognitive neuropsychology, and the theories of 
Freud, Todd Feinberg has made an impressive attempt 
to explain a diverse set of strange and seemingly intrac-
table syndromes. These include the misidentification 
syndromes, as well as asomatognosia and its more 
severe variant, somatoparaphrenia. In what follows, I 
will make several comments and criticisms directed 
toward the improvement of Feinberg’s approach.
Personal significance
These disorders are to be viewed as malfunctions in 
the brain’s systems for representing and tracking peo-
ple and things of personal significance, according to 
Feinberg. Something is of personal significance to a 
patient if it makes specific reference to personal iden-
tity, sense of self, the personal significance of self to 
others or how the individual expresses their specifi-
cally personal and autobiographical history. There are 
two principle weaknesses in the personal significance 
hypothesis. First, the notion of personal significance 
is too broad as it stands—that is, it does not specify a 
small enough set of brain states. The majority of repre-
sentations in our brains meet this description. Second, 
it does not give a specific explanation for the content 
of the Capgras delusion: that the familiar person is an 
impostor. Why do so many different patients, with dif-
ferent backgrounds, different personalities, and differ-
ent comorbidity, all produce the same highly unlikely 
story? Why don’t they say, “Dad seems strange to me,” 
“I don’t have any feelings for Dad any more,” or “Dad 
has changed in some way”?
Feinberg also seems to overlook an important dis-
tinction between representing something as literally 
me or a part of me (e.g., my arm) and representing 
something as very closely related to me (e.g., a spouse). 
The presence of “mixed” patients, who show both an 
increase and a decrease in their senses of personal 
relatedness for an object or person, is also troubling, 
since it indicates that the patients do not line up neatly 
on a single personal relatedness continuum. It seems 
more plausible that a patient would either tend to push 
people outside the circle of the personally related, or 
bring them in, but not both. One way to respond to 
these criticisms would be to further specify the mecha-
nism that allows both types while affecting only repre-
sentations of personally related people or objects.
To claim that someone is not your father but, rather, 
someone posing as your father is to make a claim about 
the identity of that person, and also to disavow the per-
sonal relatedness of that person. Logically, the identity 
of someone is independent of that person’s degree of 
personal relatedness to us, but in practicality, when 
the identity of loved ones is at stake, alterations in 
perceived identity will also involve alterations in per-
ceived personal relatedness. Conversely, alterations in 
the patient’s sense of personal relatedness need not also 
involve alternations in perceived identity. One might 
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experience a loss in the sense of personal relatedness to 
a person yet not doubt the identity of that person, even 
if that person is one’s father, so that the person might 
say, “Dad seems strangely unfamiliar to me.” Thus, an 
alteration in one’s sense of personal relatedness alone 
is not sufficient to produce a misidentification patient.
If the bodily self and the relational self are two 
separate, different parts of our sense of self, why is 
somatoparaphrenia similar to Capgras syndrome? One 
way that Feinberg could support the idea of a neu-
tral–personal dichotomy is to generate more evidence 
for his claim that the personal confabulations are more 
enduring and refractory to correction than neutral con-
fabulations. However, this may be true of beliefs about 
ourselves in general. It would be helpful to compare 
Feinberg’s conception of the self with some others 
such as that of Damasio (1999) or of Gazzaniga’s 
(1995) left-brain interpreter, or relate it to Newen and 
Vogeley’s (2003) classification of the different types of 
self-representations.
The two-factor approach
One competing approach is called the two-fac-
tor account (Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, & Breen, 
2001; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000). According to this 
approach, the patients’ delusions are the product of 
two separate kinds of damage to their cognitive sys-
tems. The first factor tends to be caused by damage to 
the posterior of the cortex, while the second factor is 
caused by damage to executive processes housed in 
the brain’s prefrontal lobes. In the case of anosogno-
sia for hemiplegia, for instance, rather than postulat-
ing, as Feinberg does, that “there is a wide range of 
asomatognosic response, from simple unawareness or 
confusion regarding the ownership of the limb to delu-
sional denial and confabulation about its identity,” the 
two-factor approach breaks this continuum into two 
discrete parts. The unawareness or confusion occurs 
when the first factor is present—in this case, damage 
to somatosensory systems—while the second factor, 
damage to the brain’s prefrontal executive processes, 
is not. Sustained confabulation and denial require the 
presence of the second factor.
One candidate for the first factor in Capgras syn-
drome is damage to our brains’ systems devoted to 
understanding the minds and personalities of other 
people (Hirstein, 2005, 2010). As Capgras patient JH 
said, when it was pointed out that the women he 
claimed was not his mother looked exactly like an 
older photo of a woman he did acknowledge as his 
mother, “It’s not the outside, it’s the inside.” An impos-
tor is someone who visually resembles a person, while 
having a different identity, a different mind from that 
person. Capgras patients will sometimes point out dif-
ferences in outward appearance between the impostor 
and the real person, but these tend to have the ring of 
confabulations. One patient claimed that she could 
tell her husband had been replaced because the new 
person tied his shoelaces differently, while another 
patient said that the impostor of her son “had different-
colored eyes, was not as big and brawny, and that her 
real son would not kiss her” (Frazer & Roberts, 1994). 
A blind Capgras patient said that the impostor’s hand 
felt softer than his mother’s (Rojo, Caballero, Iruela, & 
Baca, 1991). Some patients admit that they cannot find 
any external difference. Our patient DS said that the 
impostor looked “exactly like my father.” One Capgras 
patient, author Clifford Beers, is clear that he searched 
for visual differences in order to confirm a preexisting 
belief that this was a different person. When relatives 
came to see him, he said, “I was able to detect some 
slight difference in look or gesture or intonation of 
voice, and this was enough to confirm my belief that 
they were impersonators” (Beers, 1953). Beers thought 
he detected slight differences, as many patients do, but 
noticed that during the delusional phase he regarded 
these as confirmatory of a preexisting belief that the 
person he was looking at was a different person.
The crucial posterior damage site for misidentifica-
tion syndromes (in addition to prefrontal damage caus-
ing executive failures) may be a cortical area called the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Cotard’s syndrome, in 
which other people appear empty and hollow, as man-
nequins or robots, may be due to complete damage 
to the patient’s ability to represent people as having 
minds. Two Cotard’s syndrome patients studied by 
Young and his colleagues (Young, Leafhead, & Szu-
lecka, 1994; Young, Robertson, Hellawell, de Pauw, & 
Pentland, 1992) had temporoparietal contusions along 
with bilateral frontal damage. The Capgras patient of 
Staton, Brumback, and Wilson (1982) showed “mod-
erate atrophy . . . at the temporo-parietal junction.” 
Similarly, a Capgras’ patient seen by Johnson and 
Raye (1998) had a right temporoparietal hematoma. 
A Fregoli syndrome patient described by Feinberg, 
Eaton, Roane, and Giacino (1999) also had damage at 
the TPJ.
The TPJ has been found to be active during several 
“theory-of-mind” tasks, in which subjects attempt to 
understand the actions and motives of others. In a 
typical task, the brain of a subject is scanned as she or 
he observes people performing intentional actions, or 
evincing certain emotions. In one such experiment, the 
right TPJ’s activity level was observed to be high when 
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“participants read stories that describe a character’s 
beliefs but low during stories containing other socially 
relevant information” (Young & Saxe, 2009). It is also 
relevant that the right TPJ activates more strongly 
when the target person has beliefs that are known by 
the subject to be false (Young & Saxe, 2009). Saxe 
describes the TPJ as an “area for representing mental 
states” (2006) that responds selectively to “the attribu-
tion of mental states” (Saxe & Wexler, 2005) and plays 
a role in developing an “integrated impression” of 
people. I have argued that damage to the TPJ of Cap-
gras patients disrupts their representations of the minds 
and personalities of their loved ones. It produces the 
appearance of a familiar body housing an unfamiliar 
mind (Hirstein, 2009, 2010).
One reason for postulating a second factor—mal-
function of prefrontal executive processes—is that it 
is intended to explain why the patients do not notice 
the absurdity and implausibility of their claims (Col-
theart, 2007; Turner & Coltheart, 2009). Instead of 
this second factor, Feinberg says that “there is a dis-
turbance in a firm and stable sense of personal identity 
and a perturbation in ego boundaries.” But why does 
the patient not react to these disturbances in a nor-
mal way and, instead, posit bizarre “explanations”? 
Feinberg’s response is that the patient adapts to the 
deficits in a “psychologically regressed fashion.” But is 
this intended to cover both the first and second factors? 
The data from case studies tend to support a two-lesion 
theory of Capgras syndrome, with a more posterior 
lesion and a more frontal one (Signer, 1994).
The phenomenon of imaginary friends also contains 
this mindreading component. Children develop imagi-
nary friends when they develop the ability to create 
representations of the minds of others. An imaginary 
friend is a mind that happens not to have a correspond-
ing body. Similarly, phantom boarders and possibly 
some reports of ghosts are due to the pronounced pres-
ence to the perceiver of minds in a space, without the 
usual accompanying perception of bodies, according to 
this approach.
The neuropsychology of the syndromes
The section on the neuroanatomy of the syndromes is 
valuable because it gives us a way to save the insights 
of Freud by connecting them with neuroscience. The 
right hemisphere is certainly implicated in these syn-
dromes, but that only narrows down the field by half. 
Feinberg notes that right frontal damage is frequently 
found, but what about the cases of damage near the TPJ 
noted above? Feinberg notes that in his study of the 
neuroanatomy of asomatognosia the patients had “sig-
nificant temporoparietal involvement, but we found 
that the subgroup of [asomatognosic] patients with 
somatoparaphrenia had the largest lesions overall and 
significantly more frontal involvement.” This fits the 
two-factor approach nicely: the temporoparietal dam-
age distorts the patient’s body image, and the frontal 
damage prevents him from realizing how odd it is to 
disown one’s own arm. But as we saw above, Capgras 
syndrome can also involve temporoparietal damage. 
An account of the function of the temporoparietal cor-
tex needs to be developed that explains this link.
Final comments and conclusion
This section contains some miscellaneous points fol-
lowed by concluding remarks. Schnider’s (2009) clas-
sification of subtypes of confabulation is rather like 
classifying cars into fast ones, red ones, old ones, and 
German ones. There is massive overlap between them—
notice that any of the other three types could easily 
occur in the context of a conversation or in response to 
a question. Feinberg suggests that provoked, momen-
tary, and behaviorally spontaneous confabulations are 
neutral, according to this personal-neutral dichotomy, 
but doesn’t this depend on the content of those con-
fabulations? A terminological point—“personal iden-
tity”—is a term from the history of philosophy that 
refers to those features of a person that maintain her 
or his identity over time. As philosophers use the term, 
it need not have any psychological import to it. The 
adjective “personal” refers to persons in general, not 
to items we regard as uniquely our own or as definitive 
of us, as Feinberg uses the term. Perhaps another term 
should be coined to avoid confusion.
Feinberg argues that Capgras syndrome is multi-
modal, and the great majority of cases seem to be 
so, although this has not been systematically studied. 
However, our patient DS showed a clear modality 
specificity. He only believed his parents were impos-
tors when he saw them in person (Hirstein & Ramach-
andran, 1997). When speaking to them over the phone, 
he acknowledged their identity. Just as its mirror-image 
syndrome, prosopagnosia (inability to recognize famil-
iar faces), occurs in the visual modality, while phonag-
nosia (inability to recognize familiar voices) occurs in 
the auditory modality, there may be modality-specific 
Capgras. The presence of Capgras syndrome in blind 
patients presumably occurs because the representa-
tions of the person’s voice are not making contact with 
some more general representation associated with that 
person’s identity. It may be that a portion of the pre-
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cuneus contains these “person identity nodes” (Cam-
panella & Belin, 2007; Shah et al., 2001), that can be 
accessed either visually or auditorily.
What is most important about Feinberg’s approach 
is the way that it starts to make the incomprehensible 
understandable. What were previously treated as color-
ful reports of delusions can now be placed in a para-
digm that relates them both to our psychologies and to 
the brain itself. This new paradigm also suggests new 
treatment techniques. Feinberg’s position is midway 
between more classical Freudian or other psychiatric 
theories—which seek to understand these syndromes 
by a sort of logic or semantics they are posited to con-
tain—and purely mechanistic theories—which attri-
bute the symptoms to malfunctions of brain systems. A 
dialogue between Feinberg’s account and more mecha-
nistic accounts such as the two-factor theory promises 
to enrich both and bring more understanding to these 
syndromes so that ultimately effective treatments can 
be developed.
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